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Abstract 
In 1977 Chief Justice Barwick gave one of the first statistical snapshots of the 
Australian courts as a ‘judicial system’ in his inaugural ‘State of the Australian 
Judicature’ address. Since then, there has been no detailed statistical 
examination of the characteristics of the Australian judicature, due in part to the 
paucity of reliable data. After the passage of 36 years, this article provides a 
second examination of Australian courts and judges using data from the 
Productivity Commission and other sources. The article describes and analyses 
key attributes and observable trends in the judicature from the perspectives of 
both the supply side (judicial labour) and the demand side (court lodgements). 
This is done across six domains: size and growth; tiers of the court hierarchy; 
state versus federal systems; civil versus criminal subject matter; regional 
dynamics; and gender composition. What emerges is a complex picture of a 
dynamic judicial system that does not always comport with common 
assumptions about its structure and organisation. There is a critical need for the 
collection of additional data on the judicature, and for research that provides a 
better understanding of the forces that will shape the evolution of the Australian 
judicial system over the coming decades. 
I Introduction 
In 1977 Chief Justice Barwick gave an inaugural address to the Australian Legal 
Convention on ‘The State of the Australian Judicature’,1 a practice that was 
followed at the biennial conference with few exceptions until the Conventions 
were abandoned in 2009 (see appendix).2 The address was intended as both an 
account of the distinctive features of the Australian judicial system and a call for 
reform in areas needing correction or development. Impressively for the times, the 
Chief Justice sought to include statistical information on Australian courts, 
including the number of judicial officers and the caseload of the courts, by 
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jurisdiction and level of court hierarchy. The appendices to the address provide one 
of the first statistical snapshots of Australian courts as a ‘judicial system’. 
The content of successive ‘State of the Australian Judicature’ addresses has 
generally failed to live up to its ‘grandiloquent title’3 and its implicit promise of a 
broad survey of the Australian judicial system. Chief Justice Barwick’s successor, 
Sir Harry Gibbs, stated that he had no responsibility for the work of courts other 
than his own, and denied he had the knowledge and experience to make a useful 
survey of the state of the entire judicature. In keeping with this more modest 
ambition, Gibbs CJ’s statistical contribution was confined to presenting data on the 
workload of the High Court of Australia. Since Barwick CJ’s inaugural address, no 
‘State of the Australian Judicature’ address has sought to provide detailed 
information about Australian courts and judges; rather each has showcased a 
variety of substantive issues affecting the judiciary, including judicial 
independence, workload and resources, cost and delays, and recruitment and 
retention of judges. The closest others have come to Barwick CJ’s account are the 
summary statistics provided by Gleeson CJ in five successive addresses, in which 
he gave the total number of judicial officers and their division by state or federal 
court (see Part III below). 
Chief Justice Barwick’s tantalising glimpse into Australian courts prompts 
us to ask what we might understand about the courts as a system if more 
information were available for the purpose of description, analysis and prediction. 
Assumptions are often made about the nature of the judicial system based on 
received wisdom or personal experience, but do these reliably reflect the judicial 
system as it functions today? This article seeks to address this question using data 
that have been reported for some years now but which have not been 
systematically explored or analysed. The data permit the question to be examined 
from two different but complementary perspectives. On the demand side, one can 
examine the number of cases that are lodged in the courts for resolution; on the 
supply side, one can examine the number of judicial officers (judges and 
magistrates) who are engaged to hear and determine those cases. This article 
focuses on data about judicial officers as a means of understanding the 
characteristics of the judicial system as a whole, but demand-side data are also 
discussed where there are significant variations in the two perspectives. 
The article is largely descriptive because description is the key to a better 
understanding of the judicial system, and is also a critical omission in existing 
scholarship. However, description leads naturally to questions about why observed 
patterns exist, and these analytical perspectives lead in turn to questions about why 
the system has evolved in particular ways and where it may be headed. The article 
considers these larger questions, but there is a need for further research and 
reflection on possible futures of the Australian judicial system. 
Attributes of Australian courts and judges are examined here across six 
domains, which are discussed in successive parts. These are: size and growth 
(Part III); tiers of the court hierarchy (Part IV); state versus federal judicial systems 
(Part V); civil versus criminal subject matter (Part VI); regional dynamics 
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(Part VII); and gender composition (Part VIII). This choice has been driven 
primarily by the availability of data and does not reflect the totality of attributes 
that merit consideration in principle. First, however, it is necessary to consider the 
sources of data on the Australian judicature and their inherent limitations. 
II In Search of Data 
Compiling data on the Australian court system was a difficult task in 1977, even 
for a Chief Justice assisted by court officers from around the country. Chief Justice 
Barwick’s caseload statistics completely omitted some jurisdictions (the territories) 
and the lowest tier of the judicial hierarchy (magistrates’ courts), and a large 
number of figures were simply unavailable even for courts that were intended to be 
included within his survey. These difficulties prompted Barwick CJ to remark that 
‘[n]o statistics of a like kind are kept on an Australia-wide basis’, and to make, as 
his first recommendation for reform, the suggestion that the Australian Statistician 
take up the challenge of maintaining wide-ranging data on the operation of 
Australian courts.4 
That recommendation has not been heeded. Although we are better served 
today than 36 years ago, there are still substantial gaps in the collection and 
dissemination of data about courts and judges. The most significant problems 
concern depth (data are limited to a small range of variables), breadth (data are 
confined to specific courts or states), duration (long time series are not available), 
consistency (changing definitions of what is being counted), and access (older data 
are only available from archives by special request, if at all). In combination, these 
problems can make it difficult to obtain comprehensive, reliable and timely data on 
the judicial system as a whole, which in turn makes it hard to plan for the future. 
Data on Australian courts and judges today come from a variety of public 
and private sources, each with its own limitations. The most important source of 
public data on the Australian court system — and the one principally relied on in 
this article — is the Productivity Commission, which has collected and 
disseminated information since 1995 on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
government-funded social services. Its annual Report on Government Services 
(‘ROGS’) has a chapter on courts,5 which includes statistics on civil and criminal 
lodgements and finalisations by state and court. Since 2003, ROGS has also 
included information on the number of judicial officers by state and court, 
categorised by time spent on civil and criminal work, thus allowing a 10-year time 
span to be examined for the first time. ROGS data expressly exclude the operations 
of the High Court and all federal, state and territory tribunals.6 
The ROGS data go some way to meeting Barwick CJ’s call for the 
collection of wide-ranging data on the operation of Australian courts but they also 
have limitations, particularly with respect to depth, duration and consistency. Some 
useful variables are not recorded (for example, gender of judicial officers), several 
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data series span only a decade, and the copious footnotes to the tables indicate 
numerous differences between jurisdictions in the way data are collected. Every 
year brings changes to the counting methodology in one state or another, and while 
this has resulted in improvements in the quality of the data over time, it can make 
inter-temporal and inter-jurisdictional comparisons misleading. The Productivity 
Commission has itself described the process as ‘one of continual improvement and 
refinement, with the long term aim of developing a national data collection that 
covers court activities across the Australian, State and Territory jurisdictions in a 
timely and comparable way’.7 ROGS thus provides a snapshot of the contemporary 
characteristics of the Australian judicial system and an indication of some recent 
trends but is not capable of identifying all relevant transformations in the judicial 
system. 
There have been considerable refinements to ROGS over the years, but it 
has remained vulnerable to criticisms about the uses to which the data are put. Two 
former Chief Justices of Australia, Sir Anthony Mason and Murray Gleeson, have 
commented that no satisfactory indicator of judicial productivity has yet been 
devised, and have warned about using such indicators to draw inappropriate 
conclusions.8 In a similar vein, a former Chief Justice of New South Wales, Jim 
Spigelman, has remarked that ‘the most important aspects of the work of the courts 
are qualitative and cannot be measured’, not even by proxy indicators.9 These key 
qualities include values of accessibility, openness, fairness, impartiality, 
legitimacy, participation, honesty and rationality. This judicial hostility to 
measures of judicial productivity (that is, the rate at which ‘inputs’ of judicial time 
are converted to ‘outputs’ of finalised disputes)10 has not dampened the enthusiasm 
of the Productivity Commission for reporting on measures of performance. These 
include measures of equity (for example, fees paid by applicants, number of 
judicial officers), effectiveness (for example, backlog), and efficiency (for 
example, clearance rates, judicial officers per finalisation, staff per finalisation).11 
This article does not canvass issues of judicial performance, thus allowing these 
issues to be put aside for present purposes. Other jurisdictions, particularly in the 
United States, are much further advanced in utilising ‘weighted caseload’ as a 
measure of individual and institutional judicial performance.12 But whether in that 
guise or another, calls for comparative measures of judicial performance become 
increasingly hard to resist in an age of transparency and accountability. 
                                                        
7 Ibid 7.23. 
8 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The State of the Judicature’ (1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 125, 129; 
Murray Gleeson, ‘The State of the Judicature’ (Paper presented at the 33rd Australian Legal 
Convention, Melbourne, 13–17 April 2003) 8; Murray Gleeson, ‘The State of the Judicature’ 
(Paper presented at the 35th Australian Legal Convention, Sydney, 22–25 March 2007) 14. 
9 J J Spigelman, ‘Measuring Court Performance’ (Paper presented at the 24th AIJA Annual 
Conference, Adelaide, 15–17 September 2006) 3 <www.aija.org.au/ac06/Spigelman.pdf>. See also 
J J Spigelman, ‘Quality in an Age of Measurement’ (2002) March Quadrant 9. 
10 See Productivity Commission, Productivity Primer <www.pc.gov.au/research/productivity/primer>. 
11 Productivity Commission, above n 6, 7.24. 
12 John Douglas, ‘Examination of NCSC Workload Assessment Projects and Methodology’ (National 
Center for State Courts, 2008); Kathy Mack, Anne Wallace and Sharyn Roach Anleu, Judicial 
Workload: Time, Tasks and Work Organisation (Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 
2012) 166–70. 
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Apart from ROGS, other public sources of data on courts and judges 
include annual reports, official websites, and data compiled and published by 
specialised research institutes, such as the gender statistics collected by the 
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (‘AIJA’). Annual reports — 
which most courts have been required to produce since the late 1980s or early 
1990s — hold particular promise because they are usually tabled in Parliament and 
thus readily accessible.13 Nevertheless, their utility is compromised by their limited 
jurisdictional coverage and the highly aggregated nature of the reported data.14 
Mention should also be made of privately held data on courts and judges. 
One such source is empirical survey data collected to answer specific research 
questions, such as the national survey of Australian magistrates and the national 
survey of Australian judges undertaken by Kathy Mack and Sharon Roach Anleu.15 
These are valuable data collections with sound coverage of the relevant 
populations, although the survey data were not available to the author for the 
purpose of this study. Such collections are rare in Australia because judges are 
regarded as a difficult population to survey due to their ‘high status, professional 
remoteness, time constraints, assumed resentment or reticence to participate, and 
concerns about the confidentiality of responses’.16 In addition, the author holds 
data on a number of Australian courts, obtained through the good offices of heads 
of jurisdiction. These data are not comprehensive but nevertheless provide useful 
examples of courts operating at different levels within the court hierarchy. In this 
article, all data is sourced from ROGS unless otherwise indicated. 
III Size and Growth 
Over the past 36 years, the Australian judiciary has witnessed significant growth. 
According to Barwick CJ, on 31 December 1976 there were 587 judicial officers in 
Australia, across all jurisdictions and all levels of the court hierarchy. Of these, 50 
per cent were magistrates, 21 per cent were judges of intermediate courts 
(predominantly district and county courts),17 and the remaining 29 per cent were 
judges of supreme courts. Viewed from a jurisdictional perspective, 85 per cent of 
judicial officers belonged to state courts, six per cent to territorial courts, and nine 
per cent to the federal courts (whose ranks had recently been swelled by the 
establishment of the Family Court of Australia). In later ‘State of the Australian 
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Judicature’ addresses, Gleeson CJ indicated that there were 889 judicial officers in 
1999, 976 in 2001, 939 in 2003, 956 in 2005, and 957 in 2007.18 A growing 
proportion of these were federal judicial officers, whose ranks rose from 12.3 per 
cent of all Australian judicial officers in 1999 to 14.6 per cent in 2007. 
Since 2003, the Productivity Commission has also published data on the 
number of ‘judicial officers’, defined as ‘judges, magistrates, masters, coroners, 
judicial registrars and all other officers who, following argument and giving of 
evidence, make enforceable orders of the court’.19 The ROGS data are not strictly 
comparable to Barwick’s or Gleeson’s figures because they are collected on a 
fulltime equivalent (‘FTE’) basis, which makes allowance for part-time and acting 
judicial appointments. Although Barwick’s ‘head count’ does not do this, significant 
discrepancies are unlikely because the practice of appointing part-time or acting 
judges was uncommon in the 1970s. At 30 June 2012 there were 1081.5 FTE 
judicial officers in Australia — an 84 per cent increase since 1976, and a 10.1 per 
cent increase in the 10 years since the ROGS data were first collected. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 using indices in which 2003 is the base year (index=100). 
Figure 1: Indices of judicial officers, Australian residents per judicial officer, 
and lodgements, 2003–12 
 
Sources: ROGS (various years); Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat No 3101.0 
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‘State of the Judicature’ (2003), above n 8, 4; Murray Gleeson, ‘The State of the Judicature’ (Paper 
presented at the 34th Australian Legal Convention, Gold Coast, 20–24 March 2005) 2; Gleeson, 
‘State of the Judicature’ (2007), above n 8, 1. 
19 Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2012 (Productivity Commission, 2012) 7.63. 
Since 2011, ROGS has also provided data quality information as an appendix to the chapter on courts. 
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The growth in the number of judicial officers stands in contrast to the demand-side 
data: the number of civil and criminal cases lodged in Australian courts actually 
fell by 16.7 per cent over the 10-year period, from 1.761 million in 2003 
(index=100) to 1.468 million in 2012 (index=83.3). There are several possible 
explanations for this trend. There may be fewer civil and criminal disputes in 
society overall; larger numbers of disputes might remain unresolved (signalling 
declining access to justice); or disputes might be resolved increasingly outside the 
formal court system, such as through alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) 
mechanisms or criminal diversionary programs. One consequence of these 
alternative mechanisms, supported anecdotally, is that the judicial system now has 
to adjudicate a higher proportion of complex and time-consuming cases, which 
may help to reconcile the apparent paradox of declining lodgements but rising 
judicial appointments. The declining caseload of Australian courts has not been felt 
uniformly across civil and criminal matters — an issue discussed in greater detail 
in Part VI below. 
The Australian population has grown substantially over this interval due to 
natural increase (births minus deaths) and net international migration. Has the 
growth in the number of judicial officers kept pace with the growth in the 
population? In 2003 there were 20 264 Australian residents for every judicial 
officer (index=100); by 2012 this had deteriorated by 3.5 per cent to 20 982 
residents per judicial officer (index=103.5), as shown in Figure 1. This suggests 
that in recent times the growth in the number of judicial officers has not kept pace 
with the growth in population. This is significant because, as the Productivity 
Commission has noted, this ratio can be seen as one measure of the community’s 
access to the judicial system.20 Yet over the longer term the opposite is true: 
between 1977 and 2007 there was a 90 per cent increase in the number of judicial 
officers compared with a 45 per cent increase in population.21 
It is not possible to draw conclusions from these ratios about the adequacy 
of the stock of judges in serving the population’s legal needs, nor from the fact that 
in 1976 the ratio appeared less favourable — there were then 24 038 residents per 
judicial officer.22 Much will depend on the level of legal disputation in the 
community, the extent to which disputes are resolved outside the court system, and 
the productivity of judicial officers in determining the cases that come before them. 
This raises systemic issues about the nature and extent of the community’s legal 
needs, and the role of the formal justice sector in meeting those needs. Despite 
efforts in some jurisdictions to assess the public’s legal needs,23 there is a paucity 
of empirical research into the demand-side of civil justice in Australia.24 
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21 Gleeson, ‘State of the Judicature’ (2007), above n 8, 2. 
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587 judicial officers: Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Australian Historical Population Statistics, 
Cat No 3105.0.65.001’ (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008) Table 1.1. Chief Justice Barwick 
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those 18 years or over) as the basis for comparison and does not include masters or judicial 
registrars in the tally of judicial officers: see Barwick, above n 1, 495. 
23 These include the New South Wales Law and Justice Foundation’s ‘NSW Legal Needs Survey’ 
(2003) and the Victorian Law Reform Commission, ‘Civil Justice Review: Report’ (Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, 2008). The demand-side approach owes much to Dame Hazel Genn’s path-
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IV The Rise of Lower Courts 
Every first-year law student is inculcated with the view that the Australian court 
system is a hierarchy in which magistrates’ courts form the lowest tier, district or 
county courts the intermediate tier, and supreme courts the upper tier, with the 
High Court of Australia sitting as the ‘keystone of the federal arch’.25 The 
metaphor used to depict this architecture is the pyramid, with its suggestion of a 
large and solid base that tapers gradually to its summit. The existence of federal 
courts complicates the picture, but they are accommodated in the metaphor by 
incorporating the Federal Court and Family Court into the supreme court tier, and 
the Federal Circuit Court (previously called the Federal Magistrates Court) into the 
magistrates’ court tier.26 In this conception, the courts are often thought of in 
ascending order of importance — from the bottom of the court hierarchy to the top 
— reflecting the increasing law-making function as one progresses from 
intermediate to higher appellate courts.27 
The reality of the court system is rather different. As noted, in 2012 there 
were 1081.5 FTE judicial officers in Australia. The majority of these (53.2 per 
cent) held commissions in magistrates’ courts, but the next largest tier was not the 
district courts (which accounted for 19.5 per cent of judicial officers) but the 
supreme courts, with a 27.4 per cent share (see Figure 2).28 Thus, viewed from the 
perspective of judicial labour, the Australian court system is more an hourglass 
than a pyramid. However, the national picture is complicated by the fact that not 
all jurisdictions have a three-tiered court hierarchy. For those that do, the 
conventional metaphor of the pyramid is generally an accurate one: the 
magistrates’ court is larger than the district court, which is larger than the supreme 
court.29 Once account is taken of the absence of an intermediate-level court in three 
                                                                                                                                
breaking work in the United Kingdom: Hazel Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think 
about Going to Law (Hart, 1999). 
24 See Susannah Sage-Jacobson, ‘The Ongoing Search for a Demand-Side Analysis of Civil Justice in 
Australia’ in Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (ed), Australian Courts: Serving 
Democracy and its Publics (Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2013) 49, 66. 
25 John Michael Bennett, Keystone of the Federal Arch: A Historical Memoir of the High Court of 
Australia to 1980 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980). 
26 In 2013, magistrates appointed to the Federal Magistrates Court were retitled as judges of the 
Federal Circuit Court of Australia: Federal Circuit Court of Australia Legislation Amendment Act 
2012 (Cth). When introducing the change, the Attorney General stated that the new titles better 
reflected their constitutional status as Chapter III judges and ‘the increasingly complex and difficult 
work being undertaken by the Court’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 20 September 2012, 11361–2 (Nicola Roxon, Attorney-General). Nevertheless, 
their core functions have not changed, and this study assimilates these federal judicial officers with 
the magistrates tier in the states and territories. 
27 On the law-making function of intermediate appellate courts, see Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The State of 
the Australian Judicature’ (1987) 61 Australian Law Journal 681, 685; Michael Kirby, 
‘Overcoming Equity’s Australian Isolationism’ (2009) 3 Journal of Equity 1, 29–34; Keith Mason, 
‘The Distinctiveness and Independence of Intermediate Courts of Appeal’ (2012) 86 Australian 
Law Journal 308. 
28 Productivity Commission, above n 6, 7.28. In these figures, the supreme court level includes two 
federal courts (the Federal Court and the Family Court), and the magistrates’ court level includes 
children’s courts, coronial jurisdiction and judges of the Federal Circuit Court. 
29 Western Australia is an exception: in 2012 there were more judicial officers in its Supreme Court 
than in its District Court. 
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small jurisdictions (Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern 
Territory) and in the much larger federal jurisdiction, this ranking is changed and 
the supreme courts gain numerical ascendancy over the district courts on an 
Australia-wide basis. 
Figure 2: Distribution of judicial officers and lodgements by level of court 
hierarchy, 2012 
 
Source: ROGS (2013) 
The demand side paints a more conventional picture, but with a twist. In 2012, 
93.1 per cent of all civil and criminal cases lodged in Australian courts were 
commenced in the magistrates’ courts, with only 4.3 per cent commenced in the 
district courts and 2.7 per cent in the supreme courts (see Figure 2). This conforms 
to the pyramid metaphor, but the pyramid is one with an extraordinarily wide base 
and a low apex. By this measure, the lower courts are overwhelmingly the most 
important in the hierarchy for ‘[t]hey are the only courts that the vast majority of 
people are likely to have to face’.30 As far back as 1977, Barwick CJ stated (with 
reference to the growth in district and county courts) that this ‘is a tendency to be 
encouraged’, as increasing the workload of the lower courts lessened the workload 
of the higher courts and the demands on the senior ranks of the profession.31 This 
patrician attitude has been challenged, however, by Gleeson CJ’s observation that, 
whatever the interests of higher courts, ‘[i]t is upon the magistrates’ courts that we 
depend principally for our ability to make justice accessible to ordinary people’.32 
                                                        
30 James Crawford and Brian Opeskin, Australian Courts of Law (Oxford University Press, 4th ed, 
2004) 87. 
31 Barwick, above n 1, 492. 
32 Gleeson, ‘State of the Judicature’ (2001), above n 18, 1. 
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This description gives a snapshot at a point in time, but the temporal trends 
provide a valuable insight into the evolution of the judicial system. Since 2003, the 
number of FTE judicial officers in Australia has grown by 99.7 persons (10.1 per 
cent) but this overall growth masks important shifts between tiers of the court 
hierarchy. The only tier to have experienced significant positive growth over this 
period is the magistrates’ courts, which increased by 90.1 persons (18.6 per cent). 
By contrast, the number of supreme court judges grew by only 2.0 per cent, and 
district court judges by 1.8 per cent, over the decade. 
The reasons for the relative rise of lower courts are not difficult to find. 
First, there are constraints on the expansion of the upper tiers of the court 
hierarchy, particularly in the final court of appeal. The High Court of Australia has 
had seven justices for more than 100 years,33 in part because the development of a 
coherent body of jurisprudence is not assisted by having a larger appellate body 
that sits in panels.34 As Mason CJ has commented, ‘an increase in our numbers is 
unlikely to add significantly to our work capacity … and it may add to our 
difficulty in achieving a consensus’.35 Similarly, the Supreme Courts of Canada 
and the United States comprise only nine justices, and the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom 12 justices,36 despite national populations that are substantially 
larger than Australia’s. 
Second, there are pressures that tend to push cases to the lower tiers of the 
hierarchy. The demand for better access to justice suggests that a principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ ought to apply to the court system, whereby matters are devolved to 
the lowest level consistent with the just determination of the dispute. This can 
promote access to justice by reducing economic barriers to dispute resolution, 
facilitating physical access to the courts,37 and minimising delays to hearing and 
determination. Chief Justice Gleeson has spoken about this devolution of 
jurisdiction as a time-honoured method of shifting a backlog of cases to the lower 
courts, where matters can be disposed of more quickly and less expensively,38 
although the problems of further burdening the resource-constrained lower courts 
should not be ignored. Public finance considerations also put pressure on the 
Executive to contain the growth in the number of superior court judges: not only 
do they command higher salaries and larger staff, but their non-contributory 
pension arrangements impose long-term costs that do not exist when 
commissioning judicial officers to the lowest tier of the hierarchy.39 Governments 
                                                        
33 High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 5; James Popple, ‘Number of Justices’ in Michael Coper, 
Tony Blackshield and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of 
Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 505. 
34 On the challenges of parallel panels in appellate courts, see Brian Opeskin, ‘Appellate Courts and the 
Management of Appeals in Australia’ (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2001) 39–43. 
35 Mason, above n 27, 682. 
36 Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 4(1); 28 USC §1 (2012); Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
(UK) c 4, s 23(2). 
37 According to Barwick CJ, ‘because the districts within which [district and county courts] operate 
are spread throughout the country, the law is brought close to the citizen, losing much of that sense 
of remoteness which courts sitting in the capital cities of the States tend to engender’: Barwick, 
above n 1, 492. 
38 Gleeson, ‘State of the Judicature’ (2005), above n 18, 3. 
39 Brian Opeskin, ‘The High Cost of Judges: Reconsidering Judicial Pensions and Retirement in an 
Ageing Population’ (2011) 39 Federal Law Review 33. 
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are sometimes explicit about this. In its 2009 strategic framework for improving 
access to justice in the federal civil justice system, the Commonwealth Attorney-
General’s Department commented that: ‘Cost is a factor in assessing both the 
demand and supply aspects of access to justice. … Where possible, matters should 
be directed to the least cost option that produces a fair outcome’.40 The report went 
on to compare the net cost of providing a unit ‘service’ in 2007–08, which was 
A$1484 in the Federal Magistrates Court (now the Federal Circuit Court), A$8817 
in the Family Court and A$17 590 in the Federal Court.41 
Many mechanisms can be used to achieve this goal. In civil cases, monetary 
limits on the jurisdiction of lower and intermediate courts encourage smaller cases 
to be commenced lower in the hierarchy, reinforced by cost penalties if a plaintiff 
selects a higher court.42 In criminal cases, there has been an enormous expansion in 
the range of offences that can be determined in magistrates’ courts, either as 
summary offences or indictable offences that can be tried summarily. The 
downward classification of formerly indictable offences triable by judge and jury 
into the domain of magistrates has been justified by concerns about efficiency and 
apprehension over expense and delays associated with higher court justice.43 
Third, magistrates’ courts have become more appropriate vehicles for 
receiving this expanded jurisdiction, possibly in response to the new demands 
made of them. They have shed their historical roots as courts constituted by non-
remunerated lay persons to the point where the modern Australian magistrate ‘is a 
judge in all but name’.44 Increasingly, magistrates’ courts are professional 
institutions staffed by judicial officers with higher qualifications, greater legal 
experience and better access to continuing legal education than their earlier 
incarnations — a metamorphosis that has been documented by many writers, even 
if the changes are incomplete.45 
V The Rise of Federal Courts 
One of the most remarkable transformations of the Australian judicial system in 
the 20th century was the expansion of the federal courts. The High Court, 
established in 1903, was the first federal court. In the decades following 
Federation, Parliament chose not to create a full and separate system of federal 
courts, such as existed in the United States, but rather to confer federal jurisdiction 
                                                        
40 Attorney-General’s Department, ‘A Strategic Framework for Access to Justice in the Federal Civil 
Justice System’ (Australian Government, 2009) 34. 
41 Ibid 37. 
42 Crawford and Opeskin, above n 30, 113–17. 
43 David Brown et al, Criminal Laws: Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in 
New South Wales (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2011) 228. 
44 John Lowndes, ‘The Australian Magistracy: From Justices of the Peace to Judges and Beyond: Part 
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on state courts46 — a choice that has been memorably described as an 
‘autochthonous expedient’.47 Over the years, exceptions were made in specialised 
areas: the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was established in 
1904, the Federal Bankruptcy Court in 1930, and the Commonwealth Industrial 
Court (later renamed the Australian Industrial Court) in 1956. However, major 
change did not arrive until the Family Court was established in 1975 and the 
Federal Court in 1976.48 In 1999 the Federal Magistrates Court was added to 
provide a lower tier in the federal judicial hierarchy, and renamed the Federal 
Circuit Court of Australia in April 2013.49 
There are various explanations for the change in attitude towards the 
creation of new federal courts and the conferral of jurisdiction on them.50 One 
consideration was that a federal court with national operation could attain 
uniformity in the interpretation and development of federal law, which state courts 
interpreting the same laws could not achieve as readily. This was the view of 
Barwick CJ at the time of the Federal Court’s creation, and a major reason for his 
advocacy for a larger appellate role for the Federal Court.51 Another consideration 
was that conferring federal jurisdiction on federal courts enabled judges to develop 
specialist expertise regarding the subject areas entrusted to them — for example in 
the area of family law. A third consideration was based on political accountability. 
In the words of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, ‘[j]udges who are called on to 
interpret and apply statutes should be appointed by governments responsible to the 
parliaments which passed those statutes’52 — a view that came to be supported 
many years later by a powerfully constituted advisory committee to the 
bicentennial Constitutional Commission.53 However, speaking critically of the 
Federal Court’s creation in his 1981 ‘State of the Australian Judicature’ address, 
Gibbs CJ rejected this view, stating that ‘it is in truth a rejection of the principle of 
judicial independence to suggest that only judges appointed by the Commonwealth 
should administer Commonwealth laws’.54 A final consideration in the creation of 
additional federal courts was the pragmatic one of lightening the workload of the 
High Court, whose original jurisdiction had become quite burdensome.55 
The creation of new federal courts did not pass without disparagement from 
some quarters. Chief Justice Gibbs controversially remarked in 1985 that the 
creation of the Family Court was a mistake because the limited scope and 
emotionally exhausting nature of its jurisdiction made it difficult to maintain the 
                                                        
46 Australian Constitution s 77(iii); Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39(2). 
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46 South Carolina Law Review 765. 
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52 E G Whitlam, commenting on M Byers and P Toose, ‘The Necessity for a New Federal Court: 
A Survey of the Federal Court System in Australia’ (1963) 36 Australian Law Journal 308, 327. 
53 Advisory Committee on the Australian Judicial System, ‘Report to the Constitutional Commission’ 
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highest standards in judicial appointment.56 Nevertheless, once the process of 
federalisation had begun, it developed its own momentum — the more that federal 
jurisdiction was conferred on federal courts, the more appropriate it seemed to 
confer further jurisdiction on those courts.57 This led to a rapid increase in the size 
of the federal judiciary, illustrated in Figure 3 using three data sources: ROGS data 
(2003–12), court annual reports, and data obtained from heads of jurisdiction on 
file with the author.58 The Federal Court and the Family Court grew steadily in 
their early years but levelled off at around 45–50 judges by the early 1990s for the 
Family Court, and by the late 1990s for the Federal Court.59 The Federal Circuit 
Court grew even more rapidly in its first decade, increasing from just 10 
magistrates in 2000 to 62.4 FTE magistrates in 2012, and only recently has its 
rapid expansion slowed. Because one of the main objectives of establishing the 
Federal Circuit Court was to determine less complex family law matters, the 
growth in the size of that Court has come at the expense of the Family Court, 
which has steadily declined in size for a decade. Throughout this period, the High 
Court retained its longstanding complement of seven justices. 
Figure 3: Number of judicial officers in the federal courts, 1976–2012 
 
Sources: ROGS (various years); Federal Circuit Court, annual reports; court data on file 
with author. 
                                                        
56 Sir Harry Gibbs, ‘The State of the Australian Judicature’ (1985) 59 Australian Law Journal 522, 522. 
57 Advisory Committee on the Australian Judicial System, above n 53, 28. 
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59 The spike in the number of judicial officers in the Federal Court in 2012 is anomalous. It remains to 
be seen whether this level can be sustained. 
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Figure 3 illustrates patterns in the development of the federal judicial system — 
rapid early growth, stabilisation, and changing relativities between the courts — 
but says nothing about the relationship between federal courts and state courts. 
This was a matter of some delicacy in the 1970s and 1980s, as state court judges 
became concerned about the erosion of the jurisdiction and status of their courts at 
the hands of the federal legislature.60 The extent to which the federal courts grew at 
the expense of the state courts in those years is a matter of conjecture. In 1981, 
Gibbs CJ expressed his belief that the federal courts had unnecessarily taken away 
jurisdiction that would otherwise have been conferred on state supreme courts.61 In 
some fields there was a transfer of discrete subject matter from state courts to 
federal courts, such as occurred with bankruptcy law in 1930 and family law in 
1975. In other fields the new federal jurisdiction reflected novel government 
regulation of social and economic activity, such as the consumer protection laws 
that arrived with the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). Federal expansion in these 
fields did not occur by carving existing jurisdiction out of the state court systems 
although, as noted, the supreme courts would otherwise have been a natural 
repository of such new jurisdiction. 
It is worth recalling that the distribution of workload between state and 
federal courts is not coextensive with the distribution of state and federal 
jurisdiction. Federal courts can generally only exercise federal jurisdiction,62 but 
state courts can exercise both state jurisdiction and such federal jurisdiction as is 
conferred on them. The conceptual basis of jurisdiction exercised in a particular 
case can be difficult to determine. For example, an action brought in a state court 
between residents of different states is a federal claim, even if based on a common 
law cause of action,63 while a matter within state jurisdiction may be converted 
unexpectedly into a federal one if a federal element arises in the course of 
litigation.64 Data on the relative importance of state and federal jurisdiction are 
thus impossible to obtain — all that can be said with confidence is that the number 
of federal judicial officers and the number of lodgements in federal courts 
                                                        
60 Sir Laurence Street, ‘The Consequences of a Dual System of State and Federal Courts’ (1978) 
52 Australian Law Journal 434; Sir Walter Campbell, ‘The Relationship between the Federal Court 
and the Supreme Courts of the States’ (1979) 11 University of Queensland Law Journal 3; 
A J Rogers, ‘State Federal Court Relations’ (1981) 55 Australian Law Journal 630. This concern 
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of state courts. 
61 Gibbs, above n 3, 677. 
62 An exception is a federal court’s accrued jurisdiction, which allows it to determine a non-federal 
claim that is not severable from a federal claim: see Leslie Zines, Cowen and Zines’s Federal 
Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press, 2002) 142–7. For a time, the cross-vesting legislation 
purported to allow some federal courts to exercise state jurisdiction, but this was held to be 
constitutionally invalid in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. See Brian Opeskin, 
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64 Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund of Australia (1982) 150 CLR 49, 62 (Mason J): ‘the 
exercise of federal jurisdiction may suddenly intrude into the exercise of non-federal jurisdiction 
without the court or the parties perceiving that a federal element has arisen’. See also Agtrack (NT) 
Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2005) 223 CLR 251, 262–3. 
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underestimate the true importance of federal jurisdiction in the Australian judicial 
system because some federal jurisdiction is exercised by state courts. 
The changing relationship between the state and federal courts in more 
recent years is better understood using ROGS data. On the supply side, the federal 
courts represented 13.9 per cent of all Australian judicial officers in 2012, and 
hence they are a numerically small (but qualitatively important) part of the 
Australian court system. The demand-side data confirms this: the federal courts 
represented just 7.9 per cent of all Australian lodgements in 2012. However, the 
statistical balance between the state and federal court systems has been volatile. On 
the supply side, the size of the federal judiciary increased by 19.6 per cent between 
2003 and 2012, compared with only 8.7 per cent growth in the states and 
territories. On the demand side, federal lodgements decreased by 10.5 per cent 
between 2003 and 2012, compared with a 17.2 per cent decline in lodgements in 
the states and territories. 
Thus it can be seen that the federal courts have enjoyed relatively faster 
growth in personnel than state and territory courts, while the decline in their 
caseload has been tempered in comparison with the states and territories. A 
possible explanation for the apparent paradox between expanding judiciaries and 
shrinking civil caseloads has been noted above; namely, the loss of simpler cases 
to ADR mechanisms and hence the concentration of longer, more complex cases in 
the courts. This may also provide an explanation for the differential experience of 
federal and state courts: complex cases might be accumulated in federal courts 
more rapidly than in state courts. However, empirical evidence does not provide 
strong support for the hypothesis of greater complexity. In surveys of judicial 
officers conducted in 2007, 67 per cent of magistrates and 50 per cent of judges 
considered that their judicial functions had increased since their appointment, yet 
only 10 per cent of responding magistrates and 11 per cent of responding judges 
gave increased complexity as a reason for the increase.65 
VI Stratification by Subject Matter 
Since their inception, Australian courts have had authority to determine both civil 
and criminal matters. Although enforcement of criminal law was the most pressing 
function of courts in the first years of European settlement, a civil court operated in 
New South Wales from 1788 to deal with the developing trading economy of the 
new colony.66 In recent years, the rise of civil and administrative penalties has 
blurred the boundaries to a degree,67 but the distinction between civil and criminal 
jurisdiction remains central to the administration of justice. Differences in 
substantive law, as well as in curial procedure, rules of evidence and remedies, 
have encouraged the specialisation of legal practitioners and judicial officers in 
civil or criminal fields. Structurally, this is reflected in the organisation of many 
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courts. The Victorian Supreme Court, for example, has three trial divisions 
(Criminal, Common Law, and Commercial/Equity), while the New South Wales 
Supreme Court makes a distinction at the appellate level, with a separately 
constituted Court of Appeal and Court of Criminal Appeal, albeit with overlapping 
judicial membership. 
This part considers three questions: the relative importance of civil and 
criminal jurisdiction in the architecture of the legal system; the way in which that 
relationship has changed over time; and differences in the civil–criminal balance at 
different levels of the court hierarchy. As with previous topics, the questions can 
be viewed from a supply-side or demand-side perspective. Analysis of the supply 
side is assisted by ROGS data that enumerate FTE judicial officers by the 
proportion of their time allocated to civil and criminal work. 
Whether by coincidence or design, judicial time is allocated to civil and 
criminal matters in approximately equal measure across the entire court system. In 
2012, 52.6 per cent of FTE judicial officers were allocated to criminal matters and 
47.4 per cent to civil matters. Data on lodgements offers an identical picture — 
52.7 per cent of all Australian lodgements were criminal matters and 47.3 per cent 
were civil matters, reinforcing the equal importance of each field to the system as a 
whole. 
Temporal changes in these relationships have been modest. On the supply 
side, the proportion of judicial time allocated to civil matters and criminal matters 
has changed little as the judiciary has grown over the past 10 years, fluctuating 
between a low of 49.9 per cent criminal work (2005) to a high of 54.1 per cent 
criminal work (2009). Yet closer analysis suggests a more subtle picture. Between 
2003 and 2012 there was a net addition to the Australian judiciary of 99.7 FTE 
judicial officers, and 64.8 per cent of this net gain was in the criminal area, 
reflecting the fact that the growth in judicial labour allocated to crime was nearly 
double the growth in judicial labour allocated to civil matters. 
On the demand side, as noted in Part III, there was a 16.7 per cent decline in 
the total number of cases lodged in Australian courts between 2003 and 2012 (a 
reduction of nearly 294 000 cases). This decrease has not been borne equally in 
civil and criminal matters: 70 per cent of the reduction occurred in civil matters 
and only 30 per cent in criminal matters. The reasons for the reduction are different 
in each case. In relation to criminal matters, data compiled by the Australian 
Institute of Criminology indicate that there has been a substantial decline in the 
number of crimes recorded by police over the past decade, and this naturally flows 
through to the number of criminal matters lodged in the courts. In the decade 
2001–10, the total number of crimes recorded across eight major crime categories 
fell by 36 per cent.68 The decline was most pronounced for property crimes, where 
the reduction was as much as 61 per cent in one category (motor vehicle theft), 
                                                        
68 Australian Institute of Criminology, ‘Australian Crime: Facts and Figures 2011’ (Australian 
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while the statistics for violent crimes were more variable, ranging from a decline of 
45 per cent in robbery to an increase of 12 per cent in assault. Explanations for the 
decline in the level of crime in Australia, as in many other industrialised countries, 
must be sought in the criminology literature, where there is little consensus,69 but 
the implications of the decline for the courts seem clear. 
In relation to civil matters, it is tempting to conclude that ADR mechanisms 
have provided a growing number of alternatives to litigation in civil cases. The 
move towards ADR has been fuelled by the pull factors of speed and informality, 
but also by the push factor of cost. In his 1989 ‘State of the Judicature’ address, 
Mason CJ lamented that substantial fees for the use of court facilities were driving 
litigants to commercial arbitration, leading to separate public and private systems 
of justice, and potential difficulty in recruiting judges.70 Yet it is difficult to be 
categorical about the role of ADR in explaining the decline in civil lodgements. In 
2009, the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council (‘NADRAC’) 
noted in a report to the Commonwealth Attorney-General that ‘there is very little 
empirical data available about the provision and use of ADR’ outside the family 
law arena, and this made it ‘impossible to get a clear picture of the interaction 
between ADR and other civil justice services, including litigation’.71 
In addition, the tort law reforms that occurred in most Australian 
jurisdictions between 2002 and 2004, following the Ipp Review,72 caused a 
substantial decline in personal injury litigation.73 The largest relative declines in 
claiming rates before and after the Ipp Review have been reported for Victoria (-82 
per cent), Queensland (-71 per cent) and New South Wales (-63 per cent), with the 
reductions concentrated at the district court rather than the supreme court level.74 
The net result is that criminal matters form a growing majority of cases in the 
Australian judicial system. 
However, this description masks significant stratification between courts in 
the balance between civil and criminal work. In 2012, judges of state and territory 
supreme courts allocated 31.9 per cent of their time to criminal work, but judicial 
officers in the district courts and magistrates’ courts allocated more than twice this 
to criminal work (68.2 per cent and 70.1 per cent, respectively).75 Figure 4 shows 
how this proportion has changed over time. Notably, the proportion of criminal 
work in the district courts rose steadily from 59.4 per cent in 2003 to 71.9 per cent 
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in 2011 before declining slightly the following year. These figures indicate that 
Australian supreme courts are predominantly civil courts, while district courts and 
magistrates’ courts are predominantly criminal courts. 
Figure 4: Proportion of judicial time allocated to criminal work by level of 
court hierarchy, 2003–12 
 
Source: ROGS (various years) 
VII Regional Dynamics 
In addition to the macro-level changes across the whole judicial system, it is 
relevant to consider differences between the courts of the various states and 
territories. There are significant regional differences in population size, population 
growth rates and levels of economic activity, and these can have far-reaching 
implications for courts. Three examples illustrate the point. First, population size 
has a bearing on court structure — it is no coincidence that the least populous 
jurisdictions (Tasmania, Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory) 
have a two-tiered rather than a three-tiered hierarchy, with no district court. 
Second, population size can impact on the type of matters determined in the courts 
— large commercial centres might spawn more civil and commercial work, while 
large urban concentrations might give rise to more crime. Third, a jurisdiction 
whose population (and hence judiciary) is growing slowly has less capacity to alter 
the composition of its courts through new appointments than a jurisdiction whose 
judiciary is expanding rapidly. 
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The spatial distribution of Australia’s population has changed significantly 
over time, making it ‘one of the most dynamic and policy-relevant dimensions of 
the nation’s contemporary demography’.76 These changes occur slowly but their 
cumulative impact can be large. As Australia’s population has grown sixfold since 
Federation, the share of the population in the south-eastern states has steadily 
lessened. Between 1901 and 2012, the population share of four states (New South 
Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania) declined, while the population 
share of Queensland and Western Australia increased. As a consequence, Western 
Australia overtook South Australia in 1982 as the fourth most populous state, and 
it is projected that Queensland will overtake Victoria in 2051 as the second most 
populous state.77 
The long-term implications of these regional population trends are likely to 
be significant for state and territory courts. However, ROGS data are unlikely to 
reveal significant temporal trends because of the short interval for which the data 
are available (that is, 2003–12). Table 1 compares the absolute number of FTE 
judicial officers in each state and territory in 2003 and 2012, as well as the share of 
the judiciary attributable to each state and territory in those years. The Table omits 
the federal judiciary, hence the figures differ from those discussed in Part III. 
Table 1: Judicial officers by state and territory, 2003 and 2012 
Jurisdiction Number (FTE) Share of Judiciary (%) 
 2003 2012 Change 2003 2012 Change 
NSW 272.3 270.4 -1.9 31.8 29.1 -2.8 
Vic 212.0 241.4 29.4 24.8 25.9 1.2 
Qld 129.1 152.8 23.7 15.1 16.4 1.3 
WA 112.3 131.1 18.8 13.1 14.1 1.0 
SA 75.3 76.5 1.2 8.8 8.2 -0.6 
Tas 18.8 20.2 1.4 2.2 2.2 0.0 
ACT 14.1 12.7 -1.4 1.6 1.4 -0.3 
NT 22.2 25.6 3.4 2.6 2.8 0.2 
Total 856.1 930.7 74.6 100.0 100.0 0.0 
Source: ROGS (various years) 
 
All jurisdictions experienced growth in the absolute number of FTE judicial 
officers between 2003 and 2012, except New South Wales and the Australian 
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Capital Territory, where there were modest absolute declines (–1.9 and –1.4 FTE 
officers, respectively). An examination of the relative shares of each state and 
territory shows that New South Wales and Victoria have the largest judiciaries, 
accounting for over half of all state and territory judicial officers, followed by 
Queensland and Western Australia. Demand-side data on lodgements reveals the 
same regional patterns.78 However, these patterns have not been static. New South 
Wales experienced a decline in its share of judicial officers of 2.8 percentage 
points (from 31.8 to 29.1 per cent). The change in the shares of other jurisdictions 
was small but the period in question is too short to discern any long-term trends. 
One issue on which there is significant regional variation is the relationship 
between the size of the population and the size of the judiciary, which can be seen 
by examining the average number of residents ‘serviced’ by a judicial officer in 
each state or territory. As noted above, this  is regarded as a potential measure of 
access to the judicial system. Figure 5 shows marked differences in the level of 
servicing, although there are no clear time trends. In 2012, the average across all 
states and territories was 24 369 residents per judicial officer, but jurisdictions 
ranged from the Northern Territory, which was 62 per cent better serviced than the 
average (9173 residents per judicial officer), to Queensland, which was 22 per cent 
more poorly serviced (29 843 residents per judicial officer). 
Further research is needed to explain why judicial staffing is relatively high 
in jurisdictions like the Northern Territory and relatively low in others like 
Queensland. Potential explanations include the size and geography of the state or 
territory, the civil–criminal case mix, the nature of criminal and civil actions 
lodged, the court level case mix, and the productivity of judges and magistrates. 
For example, the Northern Territory is a geographically large jurisdiction with 
many remote Indigenous communities. It also has one of the highest proportions of 
criminal case load — in 2012, 68.1 per cent of all lodgements in the Territory were 
criminal, compared with a national average of 57.2 per cent. These considerations 
may go some way to explaining the judicial staffing levels, although the Northern 
Territory is not unique in these respects. 
                                                        
78 The percentage shares of total (civil and criminal) lodgements in state and territory courts in 2012 
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Figure 5: Number of residents per judicial officer by jurisdiction, 2003–12. 
 
Sources: ROGS (various years); Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat No 3101.0 
VIII Women in the Judiciary 
One of the fundamental transformations that has taken place in the Australian 
judiciary is the change in its gender composition. Judicial office has long been a 
male-dominated profession, the product of ‘discriminatory, systemic and structural 
practices in the legal profession’ that prevent female advocates from receiving the 
same opportunities as male advocates.79 It is not intended to address here the very 
rich literature on women and the judiciary,80 but rather to present key data that can 
inform our understanding of this important transformation. 
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Although Australia’s first female judge (Dame Roma Mitchell) was 
appointed to the Supreme Court of South Australia in 1965, nearly 50 years ago, 
significant inroads have been made only in the past two decades. Women now 
comprise well more than half of those who graduate from law schools,81 but only 
about one-third of all Australian judicial officers are female, which is reasonably 
similar to the experience in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.82 
In 2012, the highest concentrations of female judicial officers were found in the 
Australian Capital Territory (45.5 per cent) and Victoria (38.3 per cent), and the 
lowest concentrations in Tasmania (25 per cent) and South Australia 
(26.9 per cent).83 
Gender statistics compiled by the AIJA show changes in the gender 
composition of the Australian judiciary both across time (since 2000) and by level 
of the court hierarchy. Figure 6 illustrates this using the sex ratio (that is, the 
number of males per 100 females), which is a standard demographic measure of 
the gender composition of a population: a ratio greater than 100 indicates a 
predominance of males, while a ratio less than 100 indicates a predominance of 
females. The gender balance of the judiciary has changed significantly over time. 
In 2000, there were 480.6 male judicial officers for every 100 female judicial 
officers, but by 2012 this had improved to 205.0 males for every 100 females. 
Nevertheless, there is a significant distance to travel in achieving gender parity — 
there are still more than twice as many males as females in the judiciary.84 
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Figure 6: Sex ratio of judicial officers by level of court hierarchy, 2000–12 
 
Source: AIJA 
There have been improvements in gender balance at all levels of the court 
hierarchy, but there are also sizable differences in sex ratios by court level 
(Figure 6). Male dominance increases with the status of the court, and thus the 
greatest gender imbalances are generally found in the higher courts. In 2012, the 
number of male judicial officers per 100 female judicial officers was 281.2 for 
Australian supreme courts (including the High Court, Federal Court and Family 
Court), and 259.0 for district courts, but only 161.6 for magistrates’ courts. 
Different explanations have been given for the gender stratification by court 
level. One possibility is that the appointments process is more gender biased at the 
higher levels. This is consistent with the ‘glass ceiling’ hypothesis, namely, that 
invisible barriers block the upward movement of women to senior professional 
ranks. The claim is not merely that there is a persistent gender gap in authority, but 
that this disadvantage intensifies as one progresses up an organisational 
hierarchy.85 On this view, fairer and more transparent appointments processes will 
redress the representational bottleneck.86 The apparent lack of women at the 
district court level may also reflect women moving at a faster rate from that court 
into higher courts, just as the paucity of women among the senior ranks of the Bar 
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may be a natural consequence of the elevation of female silks to the Bench.87 An 
alternative explanation, proposed by Mack and Roach Anleu, is that different 
factors attract men and women into different positions within the judiciary.88 Their 
national survey of judges revealed that ‘value to society’, ‘hours’, and ‘opportunity 
for career enhancement’ were more important reasons for becoming a judge or 
magistrate for women than for men at each court level. Women may thus be more 
likely to see a judicial appointment at any level as a positive move, while men may 
require a higher-level appointment to justify the perceived sacrifices associated 
with appointment to the Bench. 
Even within a court level, there can be significant differences between the 
states and territories, leading one to contemplate the nature of the barriers that have 
made some jurisdictions more resistant to change. Among the district courts, for 
example, the sex ratio in 2012 varied from 153.8 in Victoria to 633.3 in South 
Australia, making the latter the most male-dominated court in the country, with 
more than six times as many males as females. Conversely, particular courts stand 
out as having moved closer to gender parity than others: in 2012 the sex ratio was 
lower than 150 males per 100 females in the High Court, the Family Court, and in 
the magistrates’ courts in New South Wales, Victoria and the Australian Capital 
Territory. 
The data just described focuses on the gender composition of the stock of 
judicial officers at a point in time. The sex ratio of a court, or a group of courts, 
will reflect historical discriminatory practices because courts comprise individuals 
appointed at different points in time over long intervals. However, the proportion 
of women in the judiciary is unlikely to change rapidly if the pool of existing 
judicial officers is large and the annual turnover is small. It would be revealing to 
examine the gender composition of the flow of individuals into and out of the 
judiciary, since the characteristics of the stock of judicial officers simply reflect the 
accumulated experience of annual increments and decrements. In particular, it 
would be valuable for future research to investigate trends in the gender 
composition of annual judicial appointments, for only this permits an assessment 
of the present-day appointment practices of the Executive. 
The focus in this part on the gender of the judiciary should not be taken to 
indicate that sex is necessarily the only demographic variable to have undergone 
transformation in recent years. The age structure of the judiciary is also a matter of 
considerable interest — reflecting changes in the age patterns of entry and exit, 
both recent and past. The age of appointment is affected by the time required to 
attain the educational qualifications and practical experience necessary for the 
effective performance of judicial functions, and by the manner in which the 
Executive exercises its discretion in selecting appointees. The age of exit is 
affected by death rates, mandatory retirement ages, and the incentives for 
resignation that arise from pension and superannuation arrangements. In addition 
to age, the ethnicity, ancestry and country of birth of judicial officers are also 
matters of interest. Australia has one of the highest percentages of foreign-born 
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inhabitants of any country in the world, and it would be valuable to know the 
extent to which the diversity of immigration is reflected in the composition of the 
judicial workforce. There is little public data on these issues — none of it in the 
ROGS data analysed in this study — and it remains a worksite for future 
research.89 
IX Conclusion 
By 2056, Australia’s population is projected to grow to 35.47 million — an 
increase of 55 per cent from the estimated resident population in January 2013.90 
What might the judicature look like in that environment, nearly 45 years hence? 
There are different approaches to answering this type of question. Futurologists 
often speculate boldly about futures that look very different from the present, 
rejecting the common assumption that what lies ahead will be a ‘steady growth’ 
extension of the past.91 Radical visions for the future include the complete 
transformation of the court system through technologies that enable humans to 
transcend their biological limitations.92 In a world of artificial intelligence, the 
process of legal reasoning might be automated, making judges and courts 
redundant.93 
While it is thought-provoking to speculate about distant futures, this article 
does not traverse that path. Instead, it opts for the modest goal of documenting 
what we reliably know about the evolution of the Australian judicial system in the 
relatively recent past. Over the short to medium term it is likely that the courts of 
tomorrow will be related to the courts of today through a process of incremental 
adaptation or evolution. Over the longer term, such assumptions become less 
reliable. Nevertheless, a better understanding of past trends is important in 
evaluating more speculative futures. In the business world, ‘scenario planning’ is 
an emerging methodology designed to provide a framework for speculation about 
the future. It seeks to overcome the usual errors in decision-making (over-
confidence and tunnel vision) by helping planners to recognise, consider and 
reflect on uncertainties they are likely to face, and thus to ‘pre-experience’ the 
unknown.94 In this process, identifying the range of uncertainties, and appropriate 
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organisational responses to them, is keenly informed by knowledge of past trends. 
With this in mind, this section summarises the six features of the Australian 
judicature described above and identifies a number of areas that require future 
research. 
1. Size and growth. The population of Australian judicial officers has grown 
substantially over the past 36 years, from 587 officers in 1976, by 
Barwick CJ’s reckoning, to 1081 officers in mid-2012, according to 
Productivity Commission data. In recent years, this growth has not quite 
kept pace with the growth in the Australian population, but the data record 
is too thin to signal a long-term trend. Indeed, there is a strong correlation 
between the number of judicial officers and the size of the Australian 
population. If the number of judicial officers continues to grow at the same 
linear rate as it did from 1975 to 2012, there will be 1715 officers by 2056 
— 59 per cent more than in 2012. 
2. Rise of lower courts. Magistrates’ courts are numerically the most important 
tier of the Australian court system, accounting for 53 per cent of judicial 
officers and 93 per cent of all lodgements in 2012. This dominance has 
increased over time, signalling a significant vertical shift from higher courts 
to lower courts. Since 2003, the number of magistrates has grown by 
18.6 per cent, while the number of supreme court and district court judges 
has grown by only one or two per cent. This great push downwards has 
been motivated in part by economic considerations and has gone hand in 
hand with the rising professionalism and status of the magistracy. 
3. Rise of federal courts. One of the most remarkable transformations in the 
Australian judicial system in recent decades has been the expansion of 
federal courts, due in part to a horizontal shift of jurisdiction from state 
courts to federal courts, and in part to new fields of federal regulation of 
social and economic activity, which have been entrusted to the new federal 
courts. In 2012, federal courts represented 14 per cent of the Australian 
judiciary and 8 per cent of all lodgements. The rapid expansion of the 
federal judicial system in the 1970s and 1980s has stabilised in recent years, 
but there have been changing relativities between the federal courts, with 
the magistrates’ level growing at the expense of the superior federal courts. 
In the short to medium term, federal courts are likely to remain a small but 
vital part of the judicial system. 
4. Stratification by subject matter. Civil and criminal matters are of 
approximately equal importance to the judicial system, whether measured 
by the allocation of judicial labour or the number of annual lodgements. 
However, criminal matters have assumed a greater relative importance over 
time: since 2003, about 65 per cent of new judicial labour has been 
allocated to crime, while the reduction in the total number of cases lodged 
in Australian courts has fallen disproportionately on civil matters — seven 
out of 10 ‘lost’ cases are civil. There is also marked stratification between 
the courts by subject matter: magistrates’ courts and district courts are 
predominately criminal courts, while supreme courts are predominantly 
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civil courts. This difference has been a persistent structural feature over the 
past decade and seems likely to continue. 
5. Regional dynamics. The spatial distribution of Australia’s population has 
changed significantly over time, with a relative shift away from the south-
eastern states in favour of Queensland and Western Australia. Over time, 
one would expect these patterns to be reflected in the judiciary, and this is 
partly so — between 2003 and 2012 there were relative declines in the share 
of the judiciary attributable to New South Wales, South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory. The picture is complicated, however, by the 
fact that there are large differences in the level at which populations are 
‘serviced’ by judicial officers in different states and territories. The limited 
historical data make it difficult to give confident predictions about likely 
temporal patterns in the future. 
6. Women in the judiciary. Finally, there has been a transformation within the 
Australian judiciary, evidenced by changes in the gender composition of the 
Bench. Female representation has improved significantly over the past 
decade and today about one-third of judicial officers are women. While this 
trend is encouraging, there is still significant gender stratification by court 
level (male dominance increases with court status); there are large 
differences in gender representation among the state and territory 
judiciaries; and even the most favourable jurisdictions have some distance 
to go in achieving gender parity. In the near future, improvements in the 
gender composition of the stock of judicial officers seem likely to continue. 
Nevertheless, more attention needs to be paid to gender in the flow of 
appointments to, and departures from, the Bench if the predominance of 
women among law graduates is to be reflected over time in the composition 
of the judiciary. 
The features just described have been selected for analysis in this article 
because they emerge from an examination of the available data. However, other 
features of the system deserve closer scrutiny if we are to gain a fuller 
understanding of the dynamic characteristics of the judicial system and if future 
policies affecting the system are to be empirically well grounded. The first is the 
role of ADR in shifting disputes beyond the formal court system. In his 1993 ‘State 
of the Australian Judicature’ address, Mason CJ remarked that mediation, 
conciliation and arbitration have reduced the demands made upon the court system, 
but that a change in legal and commercial culture is needed if the massive cost of 
adversarial litigation is to be avoided in commercial matters.95 Yet French CJ has 
cautioned that, whatever the merits of the ‘Multi-Door’ courthouse, courts are not 
simply public providers of dispute resolution services, and ADR can never replace 
the role of the courts in the enforcement of rights and obligations according to 
law.96 
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A second feature is the existence of a network of tribunals that have a 
parallel (and sometimes overlapping) role to courts in the resolution of civil 
disputes. Tribunals are important because, as Gibbs CJ has observed, ‘in a true 
sense they form part of the judicial system of the nation, and they perform 
functions which are of great and increasing importance to large sections of 
society’.97 Key questions here are whether tribunals have siphoned work from the 
courts and what impact this has had on their mutual co-existence. The answers 
require a distinction to be drawn between federal and state tribunals. In the federal 
sphere, constitutional principles require a strict separation of powers, which 
ensures that federal tribunals cannot exercise judicial power and hence cannot 
determine matters that are the proper preserve of the courts.98 By contrast, there is 
no formal separation of powers at the state level and legislatures are generally free 
to confer judicial power on state tribunals. In practice, many state tribunals are 
empowered to perform judicial work that would otherwise have been undertaken 
by state courts.99 The Chief Justice of Victoria has gone so far as to describe state 
tribunals as ‘tigers in the jungle’, which are increasingly competing with the courts 
for jurisdiction, power and resources.100 
A third feature is the fragmentation of the judiciary through the 
establishment of specialised courts in areas such as environmental, industrial and 
workers’ compensation law. Some Chief Justices have perceived a danger that ‘if 
law comes to be administered through a multitude of special courts the strength 
and independence of the judiciary may eventually come to be undermined’.101 
Finally, there is the quest on the part of the Executive for greater flexibility 
in the supply of judicial labour through increasing use of masters and judicial 
registrars, the appointment of part-time judicial officers, and the commissioning of 
acting judicial officers on short-term appointments to address temporary backlogs. 
In 1977, Barwick CJ thought it ‘appropriate that the Chief Justice of 
Australia should undertake the task from time to time of indicating the state of the 
judicature, generalising in an Australian context and … speaking both of 
improvement and of the need for correction and development’.102 For the most 
part, his successors fulfilled that expectation by addressing broad thematic issues 
affecting the Australian judiciary. Hampered by lack of data, they generally failed 
to describe or account for the characteristics of a dynamic system experiencing 
both growth and decay.  
Today, comprehensive information on key aspects of the judicial system 
remains a scarce commodity, but sufficient data are available to make the exercise 
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worthwhile. An initial task, to which this article makes a small contribution, is to 
use the available data to describe and explain the judicial system as it currently 
operates. In the medium term, there is a pressing need for more empirical research 
to bring us to a fuller understanding of the Australian judicature and its likely 
trajectory over the coming decades. In the longer term, comparative research on 
these matters is also desirable, as an aid to understanding the drivers of change in 
judicial systems that may have shared traditions or face similar challenges. 






Location Date Publication 
1977 Barwick 19th Sydney 8 July (1977) 51 Australian Law 
Journal 480 
1979 Barwick 20th  Adelaide 2 July (1979) 53 Australian Law 
Journal 487 
1981 Gibbs 21st  Hobart 10 July (1981) 55 Australian Law 
Journal 677 
1983 Gibbs  22nd  Brisbane 8 July (1983) 4(12) Legal 
Reporter 4 
1985 Gibbs 23rd Melbourne 5 Aug (1985) 59 Australian Law 
Journal 522 
1987 Mason 24th  Perth 20 Sept (1987) 61 Australian Law 
Journal 681 
1989 Mason 26th  Sydney 18 Aug (1989) 15 Commercial Law 
Bulletin 1533 
1993 Mason 28th Hobart 30 Sept (1994) 68 Australian Law 
Journal 125 
1997 Brennan 30th Melbourne 19 Sept (1998) 72 Australian Law 
Journal 33 
1999 Gleeson 31st Canberra 10 Oct www.lawcouncil.asn.au 
2001 Gleeson 32nd  Canberra 14 Oct www.lawcouncil.asn.au 
2003 Gleeson 33rd Melbourne 17 April www.lawcouncil.asn.au 
2005 Gleeson 34th Gold Coast 24 Mar www.lawcouncil.asn.au 
2007 Gleeson 35th Sydney 25 Mar www.lawcouncil.asn.au 
2009 French 36th Perth 18 Sept www.lawcouncil.asn.au 
 
